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“The question is, how can forms of identity and identification of 
such scope—ethnic labels that are abstract containers for the identities 
of thousands, often millions, of persons—become transformed into 
instruments of the most brutally intimate forms of violence?”
-Arjun Appadurai
One of the most significant questions of our time, brought to light 
by the revered ideologist Arjun Appadurai in his essay, Dead Certainty: 
Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization, implores contemplation of 
the process wherein a mere social categorization transcends its origin 
as an intangible concept, giving rise to massive, fatal consequences. To 
an American, genocide is an abstract concept foreign to the life lived 
in pursuit and service of the American Dream. Americans miss the big 
picture. Distant from and unaware to the facts of  pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-colonial African history, many Americans still assume Africa 
is filled with underdeveloped, warring tribal cultures. This perspective 
succeeds in turning many a blind eye to the structuralized social 
hierarchies pre-existing within these cultures and more relevantly 
the cultural wounds inflicted by Western imperialist powers like 
Germany, Belgium and France. In their gamble with power and pursuit 
of self-benefaction, these nations irreversibly altered the greater 
political paradigm once inherent to Africa, imposing a new collective 
consciousness—one bound by the constraints of social categorization—for 
the many people across this continent. 
In Rwanda, two opposing tribal groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, 
struggle violently for conquest, for empowerment, and to imbue their 
collective self with distinct identity. Fostered during the 19th-century 
European conquest, these mounting struggles have nurtured explicit 
definitions of Hutu and Tutsi. Born from insecurity and uncertainty 
stemming from favoritism during imperialistic rule, these ethnic labels 
create a desire for certainty attainable only through acceptance of 
severely categorical identities. Using Appadurai’s observations—on how 
the powerful voices in Rwanda’s traditionally oral society successfully 
used communication channels for spreading rhetoric bent upon creating 
specific identities dependent on nativeness—as a hypothetical anchor, the 
complex conditions that conceivably nurtured explosive racial violence in 
our globalized era are easier to grasp. Further, by exploring theories from 
anthropologist Liisa Malkki’s studies on exiled Hutu refugees in Purity 
and Exile and European colonizers’ role in shaping social categories and 
instilling antagonism through favoritism in Philip Gourevitch’s We wish 
to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories 
from Rwanda, foreigners, living within utterly different social constructs 
themselves, can more deeply understand how and why these ethnic labels 
may have converted to motives for merciless violence in Rwanda. 
In April 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis died within a 
100-day period, slaughtered by their Hutu neighbors and relatives. This 
is not an isolated, reactionary incident. This kind of wide-scale operation 
does not simply happen overnight. It stems from highly orchestrated 
politics involving “propaganda, rumor, prejudice and memory”, bent 
on obtaining and controlling power (Appadurai 305).  As Appadurai 
discussed in his work on identity, “forms of knowledge [are]…associated 
with heightened conviction…capable of producing inhumane degrees 
of violence”, thus this gruesome event grew from a developing certainty 
(305). Using the aforementioned rhetorical tactics centered on alleviating 
all painful uncertainty by defining the self through rejecting and 
eliminating the “other”, those pulling the strings fostered and enforced 
a conviction based in purity and autochthony—as the theorist Peter 
Geschiere defined it, “to be born from the soil”—to justify murder while 
keeping their hands relatively clean (2). Looking for certainty, belonging, 
success and protection, normal folk butchered their neighbors in villages 
and towns all across their homeland. This methodical population control 
NEWTON / POWER AND RHETORIC
¤ LUCERNA ¤34 35
owes its success to Rwanda’s long-term integration of social constructs 
organized by necessary relationships to the land into everyday hegemonic 
identities. Thus, it seems the genocide arose neither from Rwanda’s mid-
20th-century independence nor from European colonialism in the late-
19th century. 
Instead, as anthropologist Liisa Malkki and her research sources 
argue, “a castelike hierarchy of categories…formed” that “centered 
around cattle clientship” in ancient times when Central Africa’s 
inhabitants first organized cultural groups and interacted with one 
another socially (“Historical Contexts” 25). Though most scholars agree 
that the quantitatively reliable historical evidence pertaining to central 
Africa’s development proves meager—thereby challenging accurate 
study—most call the area’s first inhabitants the Twa. Known as forest 
dwellers and hunters, these people lived simply until the Hutu, an 
agriculturalist group, filtered into the land to co-exist among them. Since 
the Twa lived nomadically and represented only a minority within the 
population, they posed no threat to the Hutus’ agrarian subsistence, 
allowing the two groups to exist peacefully, while some oral traditions 
suggest the Hutu “constituted relatively decentralized, ‘minor polities’” 
controlled by kings (Malkki, “Historical Contexts” 21). The Hutus later 
adopted this historical perspective, suggesting that they helped to 
build Rwanda as a civilized, social community through its institution of 
early politics that promoted peaceful interaction with the indigenous 
Twa, to support arguments that they had natural rights to the country 
because they birthed it. Over time, a third group called the pastoral 
Tutsi migrated into the territory, which then primarily bore Hutus. This 
“large-scale movement of persons” brought with it a different social 
and economic structure, so the Hutus initially tolerated and adapted 
to the Tutsi methods for existence because they needed the same land 
and natural resources to prosper (Appadurai 308). Adopting the Hutus’ 
historical view as a reference point, Malkki draws from the comparative 
study of Burundi and Rwanda by Lemarchand, which discusses cattle 
clientship’s development in Rwanda. On questioning how a minority 
group like the Tutsi so easily attained dominance in the region, 
Lemarchand adopts the “more widely accepted explanation...that the 
Tutsi used their cattle as a lever of economic power…[in] a special form of 
cattle clientship, or cattle contract…[to acquire] sovereign political rights 
over their Hutu clients” (qtd. in Malkki, “Historical Contexts” 25). To 
Lemarchand it seems the contract began as a more fluid and symbiotic 
relationship centered on “mutual dependence” involving “the exchange 
of cattle for agricultural products”; however, the cattle’s substantial value 
and importance far outweighed crops, eventually tipping the scales to 
favor the Tutsi pastoralists (qtd. in Malkki, “Historical Contexts” 26). 
Whether or not this relationship was purposefully intended is 
practically untraceable, as Philip Gourevitch points out in his journalistic 
account of the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath, We wish to inform 
you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from 
Rwanda. To him, the theories on original settlers are solely traditional 
legends passed down as what Malkki deemed “mythico-history”, 
developments of historical lineage with a moralistic emphasis (“The 
Mythico” 54). Each group wove their own tale explaining their origins 
and why they were the favored race: the Hutu claimed moral privilege 
to autochthony because they first settled and brought civilization to the 
Twa in Rwanda, while the Tutsi believed they were the chosen people, 
given cattle as a valuable gift by a heavenly power in order to prosper 
(Gourevitch 47-48). These mythico-histories became important later 
in the 20th century when the Hutus overthrew the Tutsi rulers and 
the new politicians emphasized their authentic origins rooted in the 
land, creating, as Appadurai discussed in his discourse on identity, 
an “uncertainty…about whether…[the Tutsis] really [were] what they 
claim[ed] or appear[ed] to be or have historically been” (308). Yet, 
despite their differing originations, Gourevitch noticed the Hutu and 
Tutsi groups’ intermingling in circumstances relating to marriage, 
religion and politics, for they shared the same language and land. 
Nevertheless, because these cultural labels connected directly with their 
life’s work, Hutus were associated with farming and Tutsis with the cattle 
they shepherded. Unfortunately, “this was the original inequality: cattle 
[were] a more valuable asset than produce…so the word Tutsi became 
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synonymous with a political and economic elite” (48). 
From that point forward, stemming from necessity and convenience, 
these two groups remained tied together by “buhake”, a mutually 
dependent “cattle contract” relationship—the Hutus reliant on the Tutsis 
for providing precious cows and the Tutsis dependent on the Hutus 
for tending land so that both groups might mutually prosper from its 
harvest (Malkki, “Historical Contexts” 26). Yet, the Tutsis’ economically 
superior position, based on cattle control, granted them ample social 
advantage. Associating them with the cream of the crop because of their 
privileged political and financial existence, thus separating themselves 
from the rest of the commoners, the Hutu majority considered the Tutsis 
excessive outsiders that needed removal. Using Appadurai’s ideas on the 
conditions for uncertainty as a reference for Rwanda’s partisanship, as 
long as the favored Tutsis persisted in Rwanda, the working class Hutus 
would always harbor “uncertainty creat[ing] intolerable anxiety about 
[their] relationship…to state-provided goods” since these “entitlements 
[were] frequently directly tied to who ‘you’ [were] and thus to who ‘they’ 
[were]” (308). In spite of this social imbalance, the class separation 
eventually expanded into a tiered hierarchy centered on a single Tutsi 
king, called the “Mwami” (Gourevitch 49). 
The first colonial invasion by the Germans in the late-19th century 
confirmed this political structure; however, history predating these 
events is completely unknown and therefore “dangerous” because history 
inherently centers on groups vying for power, and as Gourevitch states, 
“power consists in the ability to make others inhabit your story of their 
reality” (48). Essentially, from within a society shaped around oral 
traditions, the victors automatically procure a monumental advantage. 
Whether achieved through extermination, banishment or surrender, the 
conqueror survives as the only source left to narrate the tale. In Rwanda’s 
case, the ruling Tutsi, laxly managed by the Germans and Belgians, 
controlled the information flow; therefore, they held the creative and 
economic power to emphasize their own overriding narrative. Yet, when 
Rwanda secured independence and the Hutus took over, the new political 
rulers—savvy to the vast populace’s habits and desires—relied on oral 
methods, specifically through radio transmission and printed articles, 
to espouse purist Hutu beliefs and slowly normalize subversive, violent 
views for the Rwanda audience. Reaching its height in the year before the 
genocide occurred, 1993, national radio stations like the Radio Télévision 
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and Radio Rwanda began spouting 
radical Hutu ideals, taking propaganda straight from the extremist 
newspaper Kangura while also functioning as a hip, entertaining radio 
outlet for Rwandans, especially the youth population (Gourevitch 99). 
Mixing doses of racist propaganda with popular music caused the 
listeners to inadvertently absorb and incorporate the ideas into their own 
personal schemas (Gourevitch 100). 
This clever political tactic is vitally important, but when analyzing 
the exact motivation for the genocide and questioning what could spur 
a whole population to zealously murder, one must consider two things: 
the Hutu power’s constant labor to remain in control and the subversive 
rhetoric they employed to condition the masses to do their dirty work. 
Maintaining their power necessitated sustaining high violence and 
opposition levels to prevent the population from co-existing neutrally, 
lest that lead to benevolence and independence. To achieve this situation, 
the Hutu elite bombarded the public with rhetorical messages via 
newsprint and radio that maligned the Tutsis. Yet when questioning, 
as Appadurai stated in Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era 
of Globalization, “the transformation of neighbours and friends into 
monsters” (316), it’s essential to note that in Rwanda’s case “verbal 
propaganda and mass-mediated images…literally turn[ed] ordinary 
faces into abominations that must be destroyed”  (316). Through the 
repeated emphasis on Tutsis as “the other” in relation to the heavily 
emphasized true and pure ethnic aspects inherent in Hutus, the radio 
broadcasters and newspaper writers associated Tutsi with non-human 
qualities, comparing them to cockroaches needing squashing. By 
dehumanizing their enemy, while supporting a collective self-identity 
rooted in autochthony, the Hutu power figures and pawns justified the 
Tutsi slaughter by convincing the masses to “let me kill you before you 
kill me”, thereby acting preemptively in self-defense (322). Additionally, 
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as Gourevitch pointed out, the authoritarian government rationalized 
the violence using an ideology explaining, “‘the logic’…of genocide was 
promoted as a way not to create suffering but to alleviate it” (95). This 
was already a main concern held by the Hutu individuals who endured 
serfdom under Tutsi rule, as well as the poorer individuals who resented 
the Tutsis’ prevalent prosperity.  
In recollecting the events leading up to the genocide, both Malkki and 
Gourevitch, as well as their peers, sought to gain understanding and to 
clarify the underlying motives of genocide and its effects upon identity. 
Both ran up against entirely fallible human accounts with notably 
lacking physical evidence. Delving to understand these central African 
people, both authors felt exposed to the whim of their interviewees. 
As Malkki describes in Purity and Exile, she relied on the varying 
stories from the Burundian refugees in Tanzanian camps who actively 
defined themselves through the “ordering and reordering of social and 
political categories...[,]historical events, processes, and relationships…, 
reinterpret[ing] them within a deeply moral scheme of good and evil” 
(“Historical Contexts” 56). During Gourevitch’s visits to Rwanda, only a 
year after the ‘94 genocide, he interviewed a mix of victims, perpetrators 
and key political figures. In recalling the fresh circumstances, these 
subjects struggled to analyze the situation themselves, just mechanically 
responding to topics hoping to grasp some shallow “understandings, 
ways of thinking about the defiant human condition at the end of this 
century of unforeseen extremity” (183). Aspiring to cope with trauma, 
the Burundian refugees actively participated in recreating their own 
history to benefit and bolster their self-identity as Hutus. Within their 
present condition, isolated and displaced from the land connected to 
their history, the refugees “emphasized the boundaries between self 
and other” essentially defining themselves “as that which ‘The Tutsi’ 
[was] not” (Malkki, “The Mythico” 54). The Rwandans, on the other 
hand, did not have that luxury. The situation trapped those left alive on 
the same homeland soil where the mass murdering occurred, which by 
then bore no resemblance, physically or socially, to its formerly peaceful 
existence. Taking a different approach, Appadurai sought to understand 
precise ethnic violence, carried out by “ordinary persons against other 
persons with whom they may have—or could have—previously lived in 
relative amity” by discussing the effect that globalization had in fostering 
uncertainty amongst people who experienced an influx of diversity 
within their formerly sheltered cultures (307). Trying to conquer these 
social ambivalences, villagers found certainty in “ethnic labels and 
categories…produc[ed] by…state policies and techniques” like purist 
rhetoric “to generate large-scale identities, which [became] significant 
imagined affiliations for large numbers of people” (306). Comforted by a 
community that shared origins, these people blindly absorbed the violent 
discourse enunciated by their leaders, which drew the foreigners as 
“ethnic enemies” (312).  
Looking at all three theorists’ studies, though, it seems that Malkki’s 
and Gourevitch’s approaches were somewhat similar in their specificity, 
while Appadurai’s study analyzed the more global situation, drawing 
from several regional examples and sources for support. Malkki studied 
idealized identities and their effect upon people’s actions and upbringing, 
and Gourevitch focused on Rwandan stories about persisting after 
the bloodbath and conflict narratives from the genocide, combined 
with an overriding assumption that foreign powers’ role in supporting 
the genocide was vast and purposeful. Appadurai, on the other hand, 
attempted to answer his own question regarding the phenomenon 
of personal and brutal ethnic violence occurring all over the African 
continent by looking at the larger social picture instead of at an isolated 
event. Nevertheless, the link that connects all the diverse incidents 
discussed by the theorists is the prevalence of globalization, which 
brought major changes to the societies it invaded, thus inciting a theme 
common in all the areas: uncertainty of the self in regards to a foreign 
threat. More specifically, Appadurai points out that dangerous certainty—
what he deems “dead certainty”— often occurs through the adoption of 
radical, violent propaganda dispensed by those in power, who convince 
people to kill other designated races in order to affirm their own identity 
(322). Despite Malkki’s and Gourevitch’s difficulty at gaining insight 
from the current generations—who either work hard to repress and 
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change their collective narrative or remain jaded from bearing utter 
social upheaval—and Appadurai’s conjecture that a rising globalized 
economy caused foreign infiltration, displacement and incertitude,  it’s 
pertinent to discuss what impact the colonial powers played in situating 
Rwanda for disaster.  
Upon entering Rwanda after the 1884 Berlin Conference, the 
Germans discovered a powerfully exclusive feudal system that paid them 
no mind. Yet, a year later the influential Mwami Rwabugiri, by far the 
most ambitious and sectarian Rwandan king, died, and the Germans 
observed Rwanda’s social structure crumble in a politically turbulent 
climate as the remaining royal Tutsi clans fought over power (Gourevitch 
54). The formerly neutral foreigners set up camp and commenced 
direct rule by the Germans.  Akin to the Hutus’ reliance on Tutsis for 
cattle, the ruling Tutsi—desperate to remain in power over the Hutu 
majority—cooperated with the Germans to receive assistance. Gourevitch 
describes this relationship as a “‘dual colonialism’”…whereby the “Tutsi 
elites exploited the protection and license extended by the Germans 
to…further their hegemony over the Hutus” (54). Infatuated with the 
Tutsi minority’s rule over the majority population, as well as their more 
European features, the Germans furthered the distinctions between the 
two races so that once Belgium took over after World War I, the divisions 
were clear-cut (54).      
Similarly fascinated with the natives’ politics and physique, the 
Belgians applied systematic tests to categorize people based on physical 
features like hair, bone structure and height. Favoring the Tutsis’ 
appearance, which they deemed fitter for ruling than laboring, the 
Belgians issued ethnicity cards to organize all citizens into either racial 
category. Dealing with insecurities and confusion themselves, European 
colonizers could not differentiate between the highly diversified, pluralist 
tribes, so they categorized people by shallow, physical traits that to them 
were more manageable. Yet, in doing this they transferred their contempt 
for variety onto the people by forcing them to mold to certain ethnic 
definitions, which with the absence of their former social fluctuation, 
made conforming obligatory (Gourevitch 55-56). Drawing from Malkki’s 
study, Appadurai discusses her observation that these “earl[y] colonial 
efforts to reduce the complex social differences among local ethnic 
groups to simple taxonomy of racial-physical signs” dramatically favored 
the Tutsi population by giving them powerful and lucrative positions 
within society (309). This favoritism eliminated the more fluid and 
equalized cattle clientship relationship in which the two groups coexisted 
somewhat peacefully, sharing the same land. Instead, it developed into a 
racial caste structure whereby the Hutu, resembling feudalist slaves, were 
required to work the land. The Hutu resented their suppressed position, 
so a “theme of secrecy and trickery pervaded Hutu ideas about the Tutsi 
elite” and as victims, they viewed their rulers as “thieves who stole the 
country” (313).
Over time, as the Tutsis became increasingly comfortable in their 
lush lifestyles, they feared losing their privilege. To avoid incurring the 
hatred they heaped upon the Hutus, the Tutsis followed Belgian orders 
to oversee Hutu “forced labor, which required armies of Hutus to toil en 
masse as plantation chattel” (Gourevitch 57).  By the time the Belgians 
left in the mid-20th century, the identity cards and supreme Tutsi reign 
admonished all chance for Hutus to advance in social class or attain any 
local control. This racially divided indoctrination, supposedly supported 
by scientific and logical data, abolished the previously dynamic social 
hierarchy resonant within Rwandan culture (57). In result, Gourevitch 
argues, “on either side of the Hutu-Tutsi divide there developed mutually 
exclusive discourses based on the competing claims of entitlement 
and injury” (58). In this orally focused society, as the cattle clientship 
relationship diminished, newer generations grew up with racial divisions 
that influenced their self-identity. Tutsis enjoyed what they understood 
as genetic privilege and Hutus felt subjugated, having experienced the 
“large labels” of racial heritage “[become] unstable, indeterminate, 
and socially volatile”, so they rallied together under historical “origin” 
stories that defined the Tutsis as outsiders, thereby granting them the 
autochthony and authentic self-identity they deserved (Appadurai 322). 
After undergoing racism and classism for so many decades, Hutus 
rebelled and took power after Belgium withdrew, giving Rwanda its 
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independence. Both sides endured much upheaval and violence in the 
process, but once the Hutu president Juvénal Habyarimana took office 
in 1973, he implemented an extreme systematic cultivation centered on 
rediscovering Hutu identity (Gourevitch 69).
Under his rule, Habyarimana favored and protected his race thereby 
letting the Hutu political power assert its rhetorical dominance over 
the masses. This idealist discourse fully actualized in 1990 when the 
president’s wife, Madame Agathe, gathered Rwandan covert extremists, 
known as the “akazu”, to brainstorm developing a newspaper filled 
with Hutu propaganda (Gourevitch 85). Initially created to mock a rival 
newspaper, Kangura eventually expanded into a forum for rhetorical 
discussion centered on vilifying the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) (Gourevitch 86). Additionally, the newspaper printed articles like 
“The Ten Hutu Commandments” that served to “articulate a doctrine 
of militant Hutu purity” by defining the essential and good ethnic 
qualities (Gourevitch 87-88). Most striking amongst these rules is the 
eighth commandment that states every Hutu’s duty is to “stop having 
mercy on the Tutsis” (Gourevitch 88).  Building upon the logic that all 
Tutsis were “innately skilled in the arts of deception” the Hutu power 
erased the Tutsis’ humanity, framing them as latent Rwandan spies apt 
to use manipulation and bent on bringing about the common people’s 
failure (Appadurai 313). In a zealous desire for power, acceptance and 
retribution, Hutus soaked up this immensely popular propaganda and 
rhetoric because it solidified their right to flourish unrestrained, enjoying 
life without foreign interference and control. Throughout this time the 
Hutu extremists, fondly called Hutu Power, commissioned jobless youths 
for military “civil defense”, calling them the “interahamwe—‘those who 
attack together’” (Gourevitch 93). Rallying the unmotivated boys around 
acceptance, while using incentives like offering free beer and teaching 
inclusive tactics that spun military drills as popular acts, Hutu power 
built their military base by brainwashing youth into believing that Hutu 
purity and aggression was necessary and acceptable (Gourevitch 93). 
As both Malkki and Gourevitch attempted, one can only try to 
study the complex situation through the people who experienced it. 
Nevertheless, ascertaining the facts from a culture with an oral tradition 
dominated by power, desire, and rhetoric mars the effort and muddles 
the details of the truth. Even Appadurai, who only looked at a minute 
aspect of violence concerning people who lived in intimate proximity 
to one another, found difficulty in clearly defining and explaining 
genocidal acts, only claiming that  “these actions indicate a deep and 
dramatic uncertainty about the ethnic self” (322). Adding to the trouble 
of gathering answers for the heavy questions relating to genocide is the 
“epidemic of shame…collusion of silence, and [the] violent need for 
forgetting” that occurs after the fact (322). Without the support and 
rationalization provided by propaganda pushers who used radio and 
newspaper communication as tools to instigate violence, the initial 
adrenaline rush and supposedly “cathartic” feeling disappeared and 
only the gross aftereffects remained. In this sobering state, left with 
hard reality and deadly consequences, the individuals who previously 
conformed to attain certainty experience a resurgence of uncertainty that 
only “add[s] underground fuel for new episodes of violence” as they try 
again to find themselves at any risk (322).  
Yet, there are no easy answers for a chain of violence perpetuated 
and complicated with each new generation reacting to the brutal past. 
Looking at former times, this cycle is a cornerstone to the history of 
central Africa, but there is no specific side to blame. Using an “us versus 
them” dichotomy, all competing groups strive to empower themselves 
by justifying their actions and defending against the “other”. Struggling 
for this power, both sides condone malice and reinvent the details of 
morality in order to improve their chance to prosper. In an ambiguous 
history with no clear-cut facts, physical features or inherent essence 
cannot define people—only their actions. Morality is a conception of 
humanity, relative to the society in which it functions. If the labels “good” 
and “bad” don’t apply in these tempestuous realms then there are no 
innocents, just the ruthless and the helpless. 
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Paige Snyder
Occupied Kultur: Cold War Competition and Musical 
Renaissance in Post-World War II Germany
¤
When Soviet occupiers marched into Berlin in May 1945, they 
found the once vibrant city decimated by the reality of defeat.  Streets, 
neighborhoods, and businesses were replaced by heaps of rubble.  The 
scene was the same all across the country.  But more damaging to 
Germans than their ruined cities was their tattered identity.  Germans 
had understood themselves as the bearers of high culture, a notion that 
existed long before Hitler reinforced it with his assertions of German 
superiority.1  But after years of war and a crushing loss, cultural life 
in Germany had all but disappeared.  Music halls, sets, costumes, and 
instruments had all been destroyed in bombings.  Additionally, after Nazi 
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels announced “total war” in August 
of 1944, most opera and orchestral productions ceased and musicians 
were no longer playing music.2  After the war, the Allied occupiers, 
understanding that art and specifically music was a critical component 
of Germans’ self-awareness, went to great lengths to revitalize German 
music culture.  In doing this, the Allies hoped to not only eliminate any 
lingering effects of Nazism in music, but to promote their own cultural 
traditions as well.  Ideological differences, especially between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, put the Allies at odds over denazification 
and reeducation procedures.  However, it was specifically this Cold War 
animosity and competitiveness that inspired each side to push its cultural 
agenda in its respective sector, opening the door for innovative art and 
sparking a musical rebirth in Germany.
1  Michael H. Kater, “Introduction” in Music and Nazism:  Art Under Tyranny, 
1933-1945 (Laaber, Germany:  Laaber-Verlag, 2003), 9.
2  David Monod, Settling Scores:  German Music, Denazification, and the 
Americans, 1945-1953.  (Chapel Hill, NC:  The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005), 24.
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